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1914 and the Archaeology of
Modern Industrialised War
1914 et l’archéologie de la guerre industrialisée moderne
Neil Faulkner
1 Tory Prime Minister  David Cameron is  spending £55 million on commemorating the
centenary of the First World War. Speaking at a press conference at the Imperial War
Museum in  October 2012,  Cameron made the  announcement  in  front  of  Paul  Nash’s
painting The Menin Road. The title is ironic. There is no road in the picture. It has been
destroyed by shell-fire. Instead, stretching to the horizon is a landscape of mud, tree
stumps, ruined buildings, barbed wire, water-filled craters, and the concrete blocks and
corrugated iron of shattered bunkers. Shells explode in the distance. Four soldiers pick
their way through the mire.
2 The Menin Road depicts the battlefield of Passchendaele in Flanders. It was, wrote war poet
Wilfred Owen, ‘a sad land, weak with sweats of death, grey, cratered like the moon with
hollow woe, and pitted with great pocks and scabs of plagues’. For in this place, during
three months of drenching rain in 1917, two million men fought each other for possession
of  patches  of  slime  and  rubble.  Nash’s  painting  depicts  a  new  reality:  modern
industrialised warfare. Some argue that an earlier war – usually it is the American Civil
War – was ‘the first industrialised war’. This is not so. The American Civil War was semi-
industrialised.  There  were  steamships,  railways,  and telegraphs.  But  there  were  also
muzzle-loading  guns,  shoulder-to-shoulder  firing  lines,  and  men charging  across  the
battlefield with flags and drums. The technology was somewhere between the Napoleonic
Wars and the First World War.
3 That is why the First World War began as it did: with an outdated military paradigm,
because theory had not yet caught up with reality. The French were perhaps the most
backward;  Napoleonic  fantasies  were  a  substitute  for  industrial  and  demographic
weakness. Lines of French infantry in blue coats and red trousers charged machine-guns
and modern artillery. The French lost a quarter of their men in a single month. 
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4 Three years later, the face of war had changed forever. Battles lasted for months. They
extended over dozens of square kilometres. The terrain was reduced to a wasteland like
that depicted in The Menin Road.  For most of  the time no-one could be seen.  Troops
remained in underground complexes of trenches and tunnels. When attacking, they crept
forward  in  small  groups,  rushing  from shell-hole  to  shell-hole.  Casualties  reached  a
million in battles like the Somme and Verdun. Yet the war went on, and the demand was
always for more men, more guns, more shells. Industrial output was decisive, millions
were mobilised in war industries, and ‘the home front’ became a target of bombing and
blockade. 
5 What was happening was outside all previous human experience, and the effect of the
war was to tear societies apart and destabilise the entire social order. This is the crucial
insight of Gabriel Kolko in his seminal study, A Century of War (1994), in which he grasps
the way in which industrial power is transformed into means of destruction of such force
that uncontrollable processes of societal collapse are unleashed.
6 This is the subject-matter of Modern Conflict Archaeology.
 
A radical new academic sub-discipline
7 Nick Saunders,  formerly of  University College London,  now at  Bristol  University,  has
pioneered the  development  of  Modern Conflict  Archaeology as  a  new academic  sub-
discipline over the last 15 years or so. A mix of anthropologist and archaeologist, his first
major published study in the field was Trench Art: materialities and memories of war (2003), a
study of art objects created in the context of war, often using battlefield detritus like shell
cases.
8 Before Saunders’  work,  no-one had taken this  category of  material  culture seriously.
Neither military historians nor art historians were interested. Many colleagues expressed
surprise and doubt when Saunders declared his research interest. What he demonstrated
is that each of these objects ‘contains’ a story of human experience in war, often visceral
experience  involving  the  most  intense  emotion,  the  object  becoming  the  physical
embodiment of the memory. It  might be the post-war widow, visiting the battlefield,
purchasing a souvenir, and then displaying on the mantelpiece an art nouveaux-decorated
shell case that could have contained the very explosive which destroyed her husband. 
9 More recently, Saunders has published Killing Time:  archaeology and the First World War
(2007),  a comprehensive introduction to the sub-discipline,  covering the full  range of
archaeological approaches to the landscapes and the material culture of the war. This is a
world away from the crude ‘buttons and bullets’ surveys carried out by sundry ‘battlefield
archaeologists’.  It  is  about  investigating  the  entire  human  experience  of  modern
industrialised warfare through the lens provided by material as opposed to text. It is
about the insights to be gained from the transformation of landscapes and the creation,
use, and loss of objects in the context of war. 
10 Saunders’ latest book, The Poppy: a cultural history from Ancient Egypt to Flanders Fields to
Afghanistan (2013)  is  a  case-study in this  approach.  It  is  a  tour  de  force,  a  systematic
analysis  that  extracts  every  ounce  of  meaning  from  the  paper-and-plastic  imitation
poppies worn by millions every November. ‘Separate, but forever intertwined,’ he writes,
‘the corn and opium poppies have generated more wealth, misery, hope, and death than
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any flower in human history, and together they have created the Remembrance Poppy,
surely one of the most ambiguous and enduring symbols of our humanity.’
11 A series of conferences run by Saunders and Paul Cornish at the Imperial War Museum
(with  associated  volumes  of  published  papers)  has  provided  an  opportunity  for
archaeologists,  anthropologists,  military  historians,  museum  curators,  cultural
historians, and even radical artists to exchange ideas. The result is a multi-disciplinary
mix which lifts Modern Conflict Archaeology clear of the parochialism of most subject
specialists. It is intolerant of a narrow focus on battle plans, object typologies, or war
poems. It demands their contextualisation as a contribution to a comprehensive view of
the human experience of modern industrialised war. ‘Running through all these varied
aspects like an electric current,’ says Saunders of his trench-art research, ‘were the lives
of real people. They had names, signatures, and faces, and their letters, photographs, and
objects  seemed to  me  to  announce  a  new kind  of  archaeology  –  that  of  the  recent
historical past in time of conflict.’
12 The new sub-discipline has subsumed within itself part of an older established tradition
of ‘battlefield archaeology’. Much of this otherwise remains unreconstructed. Some of it
is  not  ‘archaeology’  at  all,  but  straightforward looting for  personal  gain.  Some of  it,
performed for the TV cameras, is only marginally better, being almost wholly devoid of
academic  purpose.  Some is  technically  rigorous  in  an archaeological  sense,  with,  for
example,  meticulous  plotting  of  metal-detected  debris,  but  remains  theoretically
disengaged and therefore rather pointless: a bag of bullets from a muddy field tells us
what exactly? The pioneering study of this kind is that by Doug Scott and colleagues of
the  Battle  of  the  Little  Bighorn  (1989),  which  really  did  provide  the  evidence  for
reconstructing  more  completely  than  ever  before  what  actually  happened  on  the
battlefield.  The  truth  is  that  no  field  project  since  has  had  such an  impact  on
conventional accounts. Tweaking the military history should not be the primary aim.
13 It  is  when  battlefield  archaeology  dissolves  into  Modern  Conflict  Archaeology  that
something of real academic value emerges. The survey, excavation, and metal-detecting
of the battlefield then becomes part of a much wider endeavour to grasp the scale, multi-
dimensionality,  and emotionally super-charged phenomenon of  modern industrialised
warfare.
 
What is modern industrialised warfare?
14 The sub-discipline of Modern Conflict Archaeology is still in its infancy, groping towards
the conceptual tools it requires to make full sense of an accumulating corpus of data. At
present  it  comprises  a  rather  disparate  cross-disciplinary  collection  of  case-studies
without  any  overarching  framework.  Part  of  the  problem  is  the  corrosive  effect  of
postmodernism on fragmenting knowledge, such that each contribution is left floating in
a void, and conclusions tend towards the banal.
15 A current fashion, for example, is work on ‘the senses’, an attempt to reconstruct the all-
round sensory experience of modern industrialised war. Many fascinating and valuable
case-studies  have  emerged.  But  this  is  not  enough,  for,  to  describe  the  feeling  of
claustrophobia inside a U-boat, the nausea in a Zeppelin, or the smell of rotting bodies,
gas, and liquid mud in a trench is just that: description. We need to be able to explain why
this is happening – why, if you will, the world went mad between 1914 and 1918, and
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condemned millions of  men to violent death and mutilation in industrialised killing-
fields.
16 Building-blocks of understanding can be derived from a combination of the theories of
Engels, Marx, Lenin, and Freud. In The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State
(1884), Engels argued that the three institutions referred to in his title arose in tandem,
each of them essential  features of emergent class society.  The patriarchal family was
linked with the development of  private property,  and this  in turn created the social
tensions which necessitated the state, defined as ‘armed bodies of men’. He explained:
The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of a public power which no
longer directly coincides with the population organising itself as an armed force.
This special public power is necessary because a self-acting armed organisation of
the  population  has  become  impossible  since  the  split  into  classes…  This  public
power exists in every state …
17 The state, in other words, is controlled by the ruling class, and it is used by them to
protect their property and wealth. It therefore faces in two directions: downwards as an
instrument  for  suppressing  popular  revolt;  and  outwards  as  an  instrument  of  both
defence and offence against rival ruling classes. We can therefore add a fourth member to
Engel’s triad: war. The division of the world among rival ruling classes, the existence of
surplus wealth which might be seized by force, and the emergence of the ‘armed bodies of
men’ constituting the state, mean that war – mass organised violence – also arises with
the development of class society.
18 For 5,000 years, war was endemic, but its impact was usually limited, mainly because
traditional agricultural societies could not generate the surpluses necessary to sustain
large armies on a permanent war-footing, nor the technology necessary to turn killing
into a process of mass destruction. The Industrial Revolution transformed the killing-
power of the world’s rulers. The Prussian Army at Waterloo in 1815 had numbered 60,000;
the Prussian Army at Sedan in 1870, 200,000. But the German Army on the Western Front
in 1914, which, in a sense, was a single vast battlefield extending from Switzerland to The
Channel,  numbered  1.5  million.  Mass  production  provided  the  guns,  munitions,  and
supplies to keep such huge masses fighting. The British had 156 guns at Waterloo, and
they fired a few thousand rounds in total; at the Somme in 1916 they had 1,400 guns, all of
them far more powerful, and they fired nearly two million shells in the first few days. 
19 Modern industrialised war is  the supreme expression of  the ‘reification’  analysed by
Marx, where human economic activities and social relationships are transformed into
impersonal alien forces beyond rational control. The First World War brought carnage,
destruction, and waste without precedent. Industrial society’s capacity to satisfy human
need through mass production had turned into its opposite: a Frankenstein’s monster of
industrialised slaughter. The alienation of soldiers in the trenches was that of human
beings about to be torn apart by the products of human labour.
20 Lenin’s Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism (1916) provided a summary analysis of the
economic, social,  and political forces that had propelled the world into the abyss.  He
described the growing domination of the global economy by giant banks and industrial
corporations, their partial fusion with one another, their organisation into cartels, and
their intimate ties with the state, such that the world had divided into national-capitalist
blocs competing for empire and profit.
21 Imperialism,  driven by the  growing ‘centralisation and concentration of  capital’,  has
continued to evolve, but its essential character remains: it is a dynamic and complex
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system of  global  competition between banks,  corporations,  and states,  with war  and
preparation for war an inherent characteristic. The basic picture is sometimes obscured
by the existence of regional powers and local militias, but often these turn out to be the
client regimes and proxy armies of the great powers, and even where they are not, few
survive for long without external aid. It is imperialism that frames the global system and
fuels its wars. 
22 Finally there is Freud. What Marx accomplished for human society – its scientific analysis
–  Freud accomplished for  the human mind.  As  with Marxism,  much of  the detail  in
psychoanalysis can be disputed,  but not the value of the method and the conceptual
foundations. Freud thinks in terms of a ‘psychic economy’, of surges of ‘libido’ – the life
force – that have to be managed, and of dysfunctions arising from the clash between ‘the
pleasure principle’ (the yearning of the organism for sensual satisfaction) and ‘the reality
principle’  (the  constraints  imposed by  social  life).  The impulses  emanating from the
unconscious Id are repressed by the conscious Ego as it adjusts behaviour to the norms of
everyday life. But what if repression is excessive or inappropriate? What forces might
accumulate in the depths of an anxious psyche, and what murderous forms might they
sometimes take when unleashed?
23 The First World War fused the technology of the 20th century with the myths of the 10th.
Nationalism was tribalism writ large. The cult of the ruler – King, Kaiser, Tsar, Sultan – or
flag – Union Jack, Tricolour, Imperial Eagle, Star and Crescent – was father-worship and
totemism. The hocus-pocus of imperial ideology is transparent nonsense, yet millions
were duped and found deep inside themselves the reserves of hate and aggression to
become murderous demons. 
24 These theories – about the state, the industrialisation of war, reification and alienation,
imperialism, ‘the return of the repressed’ and ‘primal man’ – provide the conceptual tools
we need to frame the rich datasets being accumulated by the developing sub-discipline of
Modern Conflict Archaeology. 
 
The revisionist challenge
25 Damaged by Iraq, ground down in Afghanistan, defeated over Syria, Britain’s rulers are in
recoil from the War on Terror imperialism of the last 12 years. Their ability to launch new
military adventures is now hamstrung by an ‘Iraq Syndrome’ – a compound of intractable
opposition on the ground, of conflicts spiralling out of control, of rival imperial powers
matching them move for move, and of domestic populations now firmly anti-war
26 In October 2001, almost 90% of Britons polled approved of Blair’s handling of the Afghan
crisis, and three-quarters supported the bombing campaign then under way. By 2009 only
half of those polled supported the Afghan War, and by 2012 it was down to a quarter. In a
recent poll (December 2013), two-thirds of Americans said that the Afghan War was not
worth fighting;  even one in  three of  US combat  veterans  were of  this  opinion.  This
dramatic swing of opinion – in defiance of the entire political establishment and their
media echo-chambers – is in part a response to the obvious carnage, destruction, waste,
and failure of the War on Terror. But opinion is not formed in an ideological vacuum: it is
also a testimony to the size and impact of the anti-war movement.
27 The  centenary  of  the  First  World  War  has,  in  consequence,  become  an  ideological
battleground. The year has begun with a very public row pitting Tory Education Minister
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Michael  Gove  against  his  Labour  shadow Tristram Hunt,  with  prominent  right-wing
historians like Max Hastings, author of a major revisionist study, Catastrophe: Europe goes
to war 1914 (2013), yapping around them.
28 Gove claims that historians have ‘demonstrated that those who fought were not dupes
but conscious believers in King and Country, committed to defending the Western liberal
order’. Many British men did indeed volunteer to fight for ‘King and Country’. Whatever
that meant to them, it clearly had nothing to do with their real interests. Just as it was
not in the interests of German men to fight for the Kaiser, Russian men to fight for the
Tsar, or Turkish men to fight for the Sultan. Cambridge historian Richard Evans – one of
the ‘left-wing academics’ condemned by Gove – is therefore absolutely right to argue: ‘the
men who enlisted in 1914 may have thought they were fighting for civilisation, for a
better world, a war to end all wars, a war to defend freedom: they were wrong’.
29 The job  of  historians  is  to  cut  through the  lies.  Millions  were  indeed duped by  the
ideologies of their rulers in 1914: nationalism, imperialism, military glory, allegiance to
monarch and flag, and all the rest. By 1918 millions of them knew better. Soldiers were
streaming out of the trenches and threatening to gun down officers who tried to stop
them; and workers were on the streets at home toppling warmongers from their thrones
and settling accounts with the war-profiteers who employed them.
30 Michael Gove deplores ‘an unhappy compulsion on the part of some to denigrate virtues
such as  patriotism,  honour,  and  courage’.  This  is  the  garbage  that  killed  15  million
between  1914  and  1918.  When  Gove  talks  about  ‘patriotism’,  he  means  nationalism,
imperialism, and militarism. When he talks about ‘honour’,  he is  not thinking of  the
‘honour’ of the Suffragette, the striking miner, or the Irish nationalist. And when he talks
about ‘courage’, he is not referring to the courage of the pacifist, the mutineer, or the
revolutionary.
31 Gove then proclaims that ‘Britain’s role in the world has been marked by nobility and
courage’,  and  that  Britain  has  a  ‘special  tradition  of  liberty’.  Unlike  Germany:  ‘the
ruthless  Social  Darwinism  of  the  German  elites,  the  pitiless  approach  they  took  to
occupation, their aggressively expansionist war aims, and their scorn for international
order, all made resistance more justified.’ Here is the heart of the revisionist argument:
the  First  World  War  was  a  struggle  between the  good empires  (Britain  and  France;
presumably not Russia) and the bad empire (Germany). 
32 Then, having won, the British helped themselves to Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Namibia, and
Tanzania, the French to Syria, Lebanon, Togo, and Cameroun. They also planned to divide
up Turkish-speaking Anatolia  between themselves and the Italians and the Greeks;  a
project frustrated only by Turkish nationalist resistance.
33 After  the  war  against  Prussian  ‘militarism’,  it  turned  out  there  was  Anglo-French
militarism instead, as protestors demanding independence were gunned down – by the
French in Syria, for example – or bombed from the air – by the British in Iraq. It is the
outcome that gives the lie to revisionist arguments about the First World War. It was a
war for empire and profit in which the many were sacrificed for the wealth and power of
the  few,  and  in  which  the  rulers  of  Britain  and  France  demonstrated  that  they
represented  not  ‘nobility’  and  ‘liberty’,  but  a  world  of  exploitation,  oppression,  and
violence. Winning this argument again – as, in a sense, the Left had won it by 1918, when
a wave of revolution brought the war to an end – has become an important component of
the wider argument against imperialism and war in the present.
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